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Random numbers are commonly used in many different fields, ranging from simulations in funda-
mental science to security applications. In some critical cases, as Bell’s tests and cryptography, the
random numbers are required to be both secure (i.e. known only by the legitimate user) and to be
provided at an ultra-fast rate (i.e. larger than Gbit/s). However, practical generators are usually
considered trusted, but their security can be compromised in case of imperfections or malicious ex-
ternal actions. In this work we introduce an efficient protocol which guarantees security and speed
in the generation. We propose a novel source-device-independent protocol based on generic Positive
Operator Valued Measurements and then we specialize the result to heterodyne measurements. The
security of the generated numbers is proven without any assumption on the source, which can be
even fully controlled by an adversary. Furthermore, we experimentally implemented the protocol
by exploiting heterodyne measurements, reaching an unprecedented secure generation rate of 17.42
Gbit/s, without the need to take into account finite-size effects. Our device combines simplicity,
ultrafast-rates and high security with low cost components, paving the way to new practical solutions
for random number generation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The possibility of generating random numbers by
quantum processes is an invaluable resource in cryptog-
raphy. Nowadays, common solutions based on Pseudo or
classical Random Number Generators rely on determin-
istic processes, which are in principle predictable. On the
contrary, Quantum Mechanics guarantees, from a theo-
retic point of view, that the outcome of the measurement
is completely unpredictable. However, any imperfection
in the physical realization of quantum random number
generators (QRNG) can leak information correlated with
the generated numbers, the so called side information.
Such classical or quantum correlations could be exploited
by an eavesdropper to correctly guess the measurement
outcomes.
The maximal amount of randomness that can be ex-
tracted in presence of such side information is given by
the so called quantum conditional min-entropy [1]. Sev-
eral approaches have been proposed to lower bound it,
depending on the number of assumptions required on
the devices used in the generator. For “fully trusted”
QRNGs [2–4], the min-entropy can be evaluated because
pure input states and well characterized measurement de-
vices are assumed (see [5] for more details). In contrast,
device independent (DI) protocols, by exploiting entan-
glement, don’t need any assumption: the violation of a
Bell inequality directly bounds the min-entropy, without
the need of trusting the generated state and the used
measurement devices. Fully trusted QRNG, including
all the commercial ones, are easy to realize, but they re-
quire strong assumptions for their use in cryptography.
On the contrary, DI protocols offer the highest level of
security, but their realization is still too demanding for
any practical use [6–10].
Semi-device-independent (Semi-DI) protocols [11], are
a promising approach to enhance the security with re-
spect to standard “fully trusted” QRNG, achieving fast
generation rate, dramatically larger than DI-QRNG.
These require some weaker assumptions to bound the
side information. Such assumptions can be related to
the dimension of the underlying Hilbert space [12, 13],
the measurement device [5, 10, 14–16] or the source [17],
for example the mean photon number [18] or the maxi-
mum overlap [19] of the emitted states.
In this work we introduce a QRNG belonging to the
family of the Semi-DI generators. In particular, we will
describe a novel source-device independent (SDI) proto-
col by exploiting continuous variable (CV) observables
of the electromagnetic (EM) field. In previously realized
CV-QRNGs [14, 20], random numbers were generated by
using a homodyne detector that measures a quadrature of
the EM field. We propose and demonstrate a CV-QRNG
based on heterodyne detection in the SDI framework: we
will show how it is possible to obtain a lower bound on
the eavesdropper quantum side information (i.e. the con-
ditional min-entropy) and to achieve, to our knowledge,
the fastest generation rate in the Semi-DI framework.
The advantages of heterodyne measurement over ho-
modyne are multiple: beside offering better tomography
accuracy than homodyne [21, 22], heterodyne measure-
ment offers an increased generation rate since it allows
a “simultaneous measurement” of both quadratures. In
addition, the experimental setup is simplified with re-
spect to the protocol based on homodyne introduced in
[14], since there is no need of an active switch to measure
the two quadratures. Finally, it is possible to derive a
constant lower bound on the conditional quantum min-
entropy, that doesn’t change during the experiment.
Our SDI protocol assumes a trusted detector but it
does not make any assumption on the source: an eaves-
dropper may fully control it, manipulating it in order
to maximize her ability to predict the outcomes of the
generator. Such approach is very effective in taking into
account any imperfect state preparation. Moreover, we
will show the results of a practical realization of the pro-
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2tocol with a compact fiber optical setup that employs
only standard telecom components. In this way, we are
able to demonstrate a generation rate of secure random
numbers greater than 17 Gbit/s.
II. A HETERODYNE QRNG
In standard CV-QRNGs, random numbers are ob-
tained by measuring with an homodyne detector a
quadrature observable of the EM fields, typically pre-
pared in a vacuum state. CV-QRNGs are characterized
by high generation rates due to the use of fast photodi-
odes instead of (slow) single photon detectors: continu-
ous spectrum of the observables typically assures more
than one bit of entropy per measurement and the use
of photodiodes with high bandwidth allow to sample the
quadratures at GSample/s. In our QRNG, we implement
a heterodyne detection scheme where two “noisy quadra-
ture observables” are measured simultaneously [23, 24].
More precisely, an heterodyne measurement corresponds
to the following Positive Operator Value Measurement
(POVM)
{
Πˆα
}
α∈C
where
Πˆα =
1
pi
|α〉〈α| , (1)
and |α〉 is the coherent state with complex amplitude α.
If we define ρA the density matrix of the EM field, the
output of the heterodyne measurement is represented by
the random variable X
X = {<e (α) ,=m (α)} , (2)
distributed according to the following probability density
function known as Husimi function:
QρA(α) = Tr
[
ΠˆαρA
]
=
1
pi
〈α|ρA|α〉 . (3)
In an ideal scenario where the QRNG user (Alice) can
trust the source of random states: such scheme has the
immediate advantage of doubling the generation rate
with respect to an homodyne receiver. Since the “raw”
random numbers {<eα,=mα} are typically not uniformly
distributed, it is essential to process them with a random-
ness extractor [25]. A randomness extractor compresses
the input string of raw numbers, such that the shorter
output string is composed by i.i.d. random bits.
In a fully-trusted QRNG, when the source is trusted
and the input state is pure (such as for the vacuum) or
the privacy of the generated numbers is not a concern,
the number of random bits that can be extracted per
sample is given by the so called classical min-entropy of
X
Hmin(X) = − log2[max
α
Q(α)] . (4)
However, ultrafast generation is worthless for crypto-
graphic applications if the numbers are not secure and
private. If security is important, quantum side informa-
tion must be also taken into account and the conditional
quantum min-entropy Hmin(X|E) [1] must be evaluated.
We recall that in the SDI framework an eavesdropper
may have full control of the source and then may have
some prior information on the generated numbers. We
will show that with a heterodyne scheme it is possible
to generate unpredictable and secure numbers also when
the source of quantum states is controlled by the eaves-
dropper.
III. A SECURE HETERODYNE (OR POVM)
QRNG
A. Security of the CV protocol
In our SDI framework, Alice does not make any as-
sumption on ρA, such as its dimension or purity: the
source may be even controlled by a malicious QRNG
manufacturer, Eve. This framework is well suited to deal
with imperfect sources of quantum states [5]. On the con-
trary, Alice carefully characterizes her local measurement
apparatus and trusts it.
In this scenario, Eve is assumed to prepare the state
ρA to be measured. In particular, Eve will prepare ρA
in order to maximize her guessing probability Pguess of
the outcomes of Alice heterodyne measurement. If the
state ρA is not pure, it can be prepared by Eve as a
incoherent superposition of states τˆAβ with probabilities
p(β), such as ρA =
∫
p(β)τˆAβ dβ. As shown below, for
quantum state ρA with positive Glauber-Sudarshan rep-
resentation, Eve optimizes her strategy by using τˆAβ that
are coherent states.
When Eve generates the state τˆAβ , the best option for
her is to bet on the heterodyne outcome with higher
probability, namely maxα Tr
[
Πˆατˆ
A
β
]
. On average, Eve’s
probability of guessing correctly the output of the het-
erodyne measurement can be written as Pguess(X|E) =∫
p(β) maxα Tr
[
Πˆατˆ
A
β
]
dβ. Having full control of the
source, given the state ρA, Eve chooses the decompo-
sition E = {p(β), τˆAβ } that maximizes Pguess.
According to the Leftover Hash Lemma (LHL) [26],
the extractable randomness in the presence of side in-
formation is quantified by the quantum conditional min-
entropy
Hmin(X|E) = − log2 Pguess(X|E) , (5)
where Pguess(X|E) is maximum probability of guessing X
conditioned on the quantum side information E
Pguess(X|E) = max
{p(β),τˆAβ }
∫
p(β) max
α
Tr
[
Πˆατˆ
A
β
]
dβ . (6)
The maximization in (6) is performed over all possi-
3FIG. 1. In the general SDI scenario, Eve prepares the state
ρA that she sends to Alice such that her purification gives her
the maximal guessing probability on Alice’s outcome. The
structure of the POVM chosen by Alice to measure ρA already
impose a lower bound on Hmin(X|E), independently from the
input state or the output of her measurement (see Proposition
1). This bound is used to calibrate an extractor that returns
secure random bits when applied to Alice’s outcomes.
ble decomposition E = {p(β), τˆAβ } that satisfy ρA =∫
p(β)τˆAβ dβ. The above considerations are valid not only
for the heterodyne measurement, but are correct for any
POVM measurement (also with Hilbert spaces of finite
dimensions). Fig. 1 represents a general protocol within
this framework. It is worth noticing that Pguess is a true
probability for finite dimension Hilbert spaces, while it is
a probability density for infinite dimension spaces (such
as in the case of CV measurements).
By exploiting the properties of POVMs, we now derive
a lower bound on Hmin(X|E) (and thus an upper bound
on Pguess(X|E)).
Proposition 1. For any POVM {Πˆx} the quantum
conditional min-entropy Hmin(X|E) is lower-bounded by
−max{x,τˆA∈HA} log2(Tr[ΠˆxτˆA]).
Proof. Given a set of POVM {Πˆx}, the maximum
over x in (6) is easy bounded by maxx Tr
[
Πˆxτˆ
A
β
]
≤
maxx,τˆA Tr
[
ΠˆxτˆA
]
. Then eq. (6) is upper bounded by:
Pguess(X|E)min ≤ max
x,τˆA
Tr
[
ΠˆxτˆA
]
max
p(β),τB
∫
p(β)dβ
= max
{x,τˆA∈HA}
Tr[ΠˆxτˆA] (7)
from which the bound on the min-entropy easily follows
by using (5).
If the POVM reduce to projective measurements, the
above bound is trivial, since it always possible to find a
state τˆA such that Tr[ΠˆxτˆA] = 1: in this case, no ran-
domness can be extracted. However, for an overcomplete
set of POVM we may have max{x,τA}Tr[ΠˆxτˆA] < 1 and
therefore randomness can always be extracted. We now
exploit the above proposition for the specific case of het-
erodyne measurement.
Corollary 1. For the heterodyne measurement the
quantum conditional min-entropy Hmin(X|E) is lower-
bounded by log2 pi. The bound is tight for quantum state
with positive Glauber-Sudarshan P(α) representation.
Proof. It is well known that the Husimi function is upper
bounded by 1pi . Then Tr[ΠˆατˆA] =
1
pi 〈α|τA|α〉 = QτA(α) ≤
1
pi , ∀τA. By proposition 1, it follows thatHmin(X|E)min ≥
log2 pi. To show the tightness, we note that any ma-
trix ρA can be written as ρA =
∫ P(α)|α〉〈α|d2α where
P(α) is the Glauber-Sudarshan P-function. If P(α) is
positive it can be interpreted as a probability density
and the state ρA can be seen as an incoherent super-
position of coherent states. Since coherent states maxi-
mize the output probability for the heterodyne POVM,
then the optimal decomposition in (6) is precisely E =
{P(α), |α〉〈α|} and the quantum conditional min-entropy
is exactly Hmin(X|E) = log2 pi.
By using an heterodyne measurement scheme, a quan-
tum tomography of the input state is also obtained [27]:
while Alice generates the raw random numbers, she also
reconstructs the state ρA. Then it is possible to eval-
uate numerically the quantum conditional min-entropy
by using (5) and (6). Although for a qubit system, this
problem was elegantly addressed by [28], it is not of easy
solution in the CV case. On the other hand, Corollary
1 gives an easy lower bound on Hmin(X|E). Alice knows
that even if Eve forges a state with an optimal E , such
side information will not let Eve guess the heterodyne
outcome with a probability (density) larger than 1pi . In
the presence on an imperfect source of quantum states,
this is the most conservative strategy to adopt, but en-
sures the generation of completely secure random num-
bers while avoiding a complex numerical maximization.
It is worth noticing that in many cases such lower
bound is tight: indeed, coherent and thermal states have
positive Glauber-Sudarshan P(α) function and for those
states the bound log2 pi is tight. Moreover, in contrast
to other Semi-DI QRNG where the min-entropy needs to
be estimated in real time to provide security [12, 14, 19],
in our protocol it depends on the structure of the het-
erodyne POVM and it is always constant. Hence, Alice
can apply on X a randomness extractor calibrated on
log2 pi and erase any guessing advantage of Eve. In the
following we adapt the bound of Corollary 1 to realistic
POVMs with finite resolution.
B. Practical Bound
In a real implementation, any heterodyne measure-
ment is discretized. This means that the possible out-
comes of the measure are discrete with a resolution
given by δq and δp for the two “quadratures”. The
discretized version of the POVM Πˆα is then given by
Πˆδm,n =
∫ (m+1)δq
mδq
d<eα ∫ (n+1)δp
nδp
d=mα Πˆα
and the average probability of guessing
their outputs is given by Pguess(X|E) =
max{pβ ,τˆAβ }
∫
p(β) maxm,n Tr
[
Πˆδm,nτˆ
A
β
]
.
The term Tr
[
Πˆδm,nτˆ
A
β
]
is upper bounded by
δqδp
pi .
4FIG. 2. Schematic representation of the experimental setup. Only commercial off-the-shelf devices were used.
Then the probability Pguess is upper bounded by
δpδq
pi
and the quantum min-entropy is lower bounded by
Hmin(Xδ|E) ≥ log2
pi
δqδp
. (8)
Hence, in the real-life implementation, the min-entropy
of the random numbers is bounded by a function that
depends on the measurement resolution only. The mea-
surement, in this scenario, is under control of the user:
Alice can readily obtain the min-entropy (8) by measur-
ing δp and δq of her well characterized apparatus. The
min-entropy is constant and Alice does not need to worry
updating its value, as long as she trusts the apparatus.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The proposed new protocol has been implemented with
an all-fiber setup at telecom wavelength with the scheme
in Fig. 2; in this way is possible to exploit the availability
of fast off-the-shelf components for classical telecommu-
nication while keeping the setup compact. The heart of
the experiment lies in the heterodyne detection of the
vacuum state, that samples the Q function with the help
of a coherent field |α〉 of a Local Oscillator (LO). We em-
ployed a narrow linewidth ECL laser at 1550nm (Thor-
labs SFL1550) followed by and electronically-controlled
Variable Optical Attenuator (VOA) and a in-line Polar-
ization Controller (PC). In this way we were able to finely
control the intensity and the polarization of our LO, be-
sides making the calibration procedure automatized.
Before entering the heterodyne measurement, 10% of
the LO is sent to a photodetector, for a continuous mon-
itor of its intensity. By doing that, any anomaly to the
normal functioning of the LO can be noticed in real-
time, and deviations can be compensated during the
post-processing.
The optical heterodyne was realized with a commercial
fiber integrated “90 degree hybrid”: one port is coupled
to the LO while from the other is entering the vacuum
state. However, we work in the SDI scenario and, from
the point of view of security, this port can be fully con-
trolled by Eve, since we don’t assume anything about
the source. The 90 degree hybrid mixes the signal with
the LO and returns two pairs of outputs, featuring a pi/2
phase shift. These optical signals, detected by a couple of
high-bandwidth balanced detectors (1.6 GHz Thorlabs-
PDB480C), are proportional to the quadratures of the
signal, Re[α], Im[α].
We sampled both signals coming from the detectors us-
ing a fast oscilloscope with a sampling rate of 10 GSam-
ples/s at 10 bits of resolution (Lecroy HDO 9404). Each
samples contains 20 bits of raw data, 10-bit for Re[α]
and 10-bit for Im[α]. The raw signals of the ADC
are proportional to the quadratures and directly sam-
ple the Q-function in the phase space, as shown in Fig.
3. The resolution of the ADC can be directly con-
verted to the equivalent resolution in the phase space;
in our case we got δRe [α] = (14.05 ± 0.02) · 10−3 and
δIm [α] = (14.14± 0.02) · 10−3, respectively.
FIG. 3. The plot shows the Husimi function for the vacuum
(meshed curve) and the measured state (colored histogram).
The measured variance is slightly larger that the one expected
for the vacuum due to the electronic noise that widens the
distribution.
5The raw data are then digitally filtered, taking only
a 1.25 GHz window in the central part of the spectrum
obtained by the detectors. This is necessary in order to
remove classical noise that is coupled with the detector.
Finally, the data are downsampled at 1.25 GSample/s,
matching the bandwidth of the signal and removing any
correlation introduced by the oversampling.
We acquired 6 · 1010 measurements obtaining σ2Re[α] =
0.55135 ± 0.00001 and σ2Im[α] = 0.56732 ± 0.00001. As
it can be seen from Fig. 3, the measured Q-function is
slightly larger than the one expected for a pure vacuum
state, where both variances are expected to be equal to
1/2. The increase of the variances is due to classical noise
of the detectors: in our approach, such noise is regarded
as a “spreading” of the Q-function and thus is already
included in our analysis for the quantum min-entropy.
The classical min-entropy Hmin(X) corresponds to the
larger probability of output and it is given by
Hmin(X) = 14.100 . (9)
However, the quantum min-entropy can be lower
bounded by eq. (8). With the quadrature resolutions
used for the experiment, we obtain
Hmin(X|E) ≥ 13.949 , (10)
for an equivalent secure generation rate of 17.42 Gbit/s.
It is worth noticing that the high gain in security guaran-
teed by the conditional quantum min-entropy of eq. (10)
with respect to the classical min-entropy eq. (9) implies
a very small reduction of the generation rate (from 14.10
to 13.949 bits per sample).
In addition, these rates are not calculated in the
asymptotic regime, i.e. in the limit of infinite repetitions
of the protocol, but are valid for single shot measure-
ments. In fact, the conditional min-entropy Hmin(X|E)
is not estimated from the data, but it’s bounded consider-
ing the structure of the POVM and the optimal strategy
for the attacker, making it independent from the number
of rounds of the protocol. Finally, a Toeplitz random-
ness extractor [29] is calibrated using Hmin(X|E), and
extracts the certified numbers from the raw data. As a
final check, we applied a series of statistical tests from the
DieHarder and NIST suite: all of them are successfully
passed, as shown in Appendix C.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we demonstrated the versatility of het-
erodyne detection scheme for the generation of secure
random numbers in a CV-SDI framework, where no as-
sumption on the source of quantum state is required.
In fact, exploiting the properties of the POVM imple-
mented by the heterodyne measurement, in Corollary 1
we obtained a direct lower bound to the conditional min-
entropy, and hence on its security. This bound enables
the user to erase all the side information related with an
imperfect or malicious source of quantum states. Com-
pared to previous SDI-QRNGs [5, 11, 14] this security
is obtained without affecting the generation rate: in the
previous protocols, part of the generated numbers were
consumed to estimate and update the bound to the condi-
tional min-entropy. In the protocol introduced here, the
bound is constant, since it is determined by the resolution
of the trusted measurement apparatus only. Hence, all
the secure numbers are available to the user. Such sim-
plification has many advantages for any practical imple-
mentation of the protocol. Our approach allows indeed
to merge the speed of heterodyne measurements and the
security of semi-device-independent protocols. Indeed,
we realized the protocol with off-the-shelf components
achieving 17.42 Gbit/s rates, which is to our knowledge
the fastest random generation rate for a semi-DI QRNG.
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Appendix A: Calibration
In the SDI framework we assume a trusted and char-
acterized measurement device. In order to enforce that,
before every run of the experiment we perform a calibra-
tion of our detection stage. This procedure is necessary
for the evaluation of security, because it links the voltage
output of the detectors to the relative quantities in the
phase space, enabling us to calculate δq, δp.
FIG. 4. The graph shows the linear dependence of the signal
quadrature σ2V as a function of the LO power.
The calibration is performed automatically by the soft-
ware that controls the QRNG: by varying the Vari-
able Optical Attenuator (VOA), the power of the LO
is changed from 0.01mW to 4.05mW, when measured
6FIG. 5. Schematic representation of the experimental setup. The elements present are: Laser source used for the Local
Oscillator (LO), Variable Optical Attenuator (VOA), Fiber Polarization Controller (PC), Fiber Beam Splitter (BS), a 90deg
Optical Hybrid, a couple of High-Speed balanced photodetectors, a fast oscilloscope used as an Analog-to-Digital Converter
(ADC), PC for the digital filtering and extraction
with the monitor photodiode. For each power, the sig-
nal of the balanced detector is recorded and the vari-
ance σ2V is estimated. As we can see in Fig. 4 the
relation is linear for all the tested powers (i.e. we
never reached the saturation of the detector’s amplifiers).
From the fit, m1 = (2.783 ± 0.005) · 10−2V2/W and
q1 = (1.526± 0.005) · 10−5V2 for the slope and intercept
of the first detector and m2 = (2.748±0.004)·10−2V2/W
and q2 = (1.419±0.004) ·10−5V2 for the second one. The
slopes were used to convert the measured voltages into
phase-space quantities.The non-null intercept in both
cases is caused by the electronic excess noise from the
detectors and, since does not originate from the quantum
measurement, is regarded a side-information available to
Eve.
Appendix B: Filtering, noise and autocorrelation
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FIG. 6. Spectrum obtained from the detectors with or with-
out the LO active. In green is highlighted the portion kept
after the digital filtering and used for the generation. The
peaks present after the 3dB point of the detectors are intro-
duced by the oscilloscope at harmonics of the sampling fre-
quency and are not present if the spectrum is obtained with
an analog spectrum analyzer (HP 8561B).
To further reduce the classical noise from the detec-
tors (at the expense of a reduced generation rate) we
perform a filtering of the signal, as it can be see in the
full schematic of the setup presented in Figure 5.
Figure 6 shows the power spectral density of the sig-
nal produced by the detectors when the LO is turned on
and when the LO is off. Although, the response seems
uniform along the entire bandwidth of the detectors
(1.6GHz), the initial part of the spectrum (DC − 1MHz)
is affected by technical noise. In order to filter out this
noise and enhance the signal-to-noise ratio, we have con-
sidered for the random generation only a window large
1.25GHz centered around 875MHz. With this selection,
the gap is never lower than 9.6dB. The selection has been
done digitally.
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FIG. 7. Autocorrelation measured for a sample of 5 · 107
filtered and extracted numbers. The spikes present in the
first lags before the extraction are due to the noise introduced
by our sampling equipment. However, they are completely
absent after the extraction.
However, employing a Brick-wall filter in the fre-
quency domain, inevitably induces correlation in the
time-domain of our signal: indeed we observe a sinc de-
pendence in the autocorrelation, as expected from the
Wiener-Khinchin theorem. The correlation is removed
by undersampling the signal in such a way to match the
first zero of the autocorrelation function. Figure 7 shows
the residual autocorrelation after the downsampling, be-
fore and after the randomness extraction for a run of
5 · 107 samples. The results, even before the extraction,
are good, with values always below 7.5 · 10−3 and typi-
cally below 1 ·10−4, except for the first lags. The value of
the first lag is due to noise introduced by the oscilloscope
at harmonics of its sampling rate frequency.
7In Figure 6, these distortions are clearly visible at high
frequencies, where there is no contribution from the sig-
nal. However, after the extractor, all the classical noise
is eliminated and the autocorrelation is completely flat,
also for the initial lags.
Appendix C: Statistical Tests
In order to check for problems in our implementa-
tion we performed some statistical test on the gener-
ated numbers. First, we implemented the fast com-
putable two-universal hash function introduced in [29],
then we used it to extract the final numbers from the
filtered samples. We calibrated the extractor with the
value of Hmin(X|E)min of eq. (10) and then we extracted
≈ 5.18 · 1010 random numbers from an initial set of
7.5 · 1010 raw numbers. We tested them with the NIST
[30] and dieharder suite [31]: in both cases all the tests
were passed, as we can see in Table I. Passing these tests
doesn’t certify the randomness, but only shows that some
patterns are not present in the analyzed data. However,
since our QRNG is supposed to pass all of them, is a way
to double-check that our setup is working as expected.
Test’s name P-value Result
diehard birthdays 0.398 PASSED
diehard operm5 0.391 PASSED
diehard rank 32x32 0.414 PASSED
diehard rank 6x8 0.767 PASSED
diehard bitstream 0.529 PASSED
diehard opso 0.655 PASSED
diehard oqso 0.758 PASSED
diehard dna 0.731 PASSED
diehard count 1s str 0.482 PASSED
diehard count 1s byt 0.361 PASSED
diehard parking lot 0.515 PASSED
diehard 2dsphere 0.484 PASSED
diehard 3dsphere 0.739 PASSED
diehard squeeze 0.580 PASSED
diehard sums 0.140 PASSED
diehard runs 0.478 PASSED
diehard runs 0.316 PASSED
diehard craps 0.348 PASSED
diehard craps 0.937 PASSED
marsaglia tsang gcd 0.504 PASSED
marsaglia tsang gcd 0.444 PASSED
sts monobit 0.204 PASSED
sts runs 0.716 PASSED
sts serial 0.151 PASSED
rgb bitdist 0.056 PASSED
rgb minimum distance 0.043 PASSED
rgb permutations 0.068 PASSED
rgb lagged sum 0.019 PASSED
Test’s name P-value Result
Frequency 0.980 PASSED
BlockFrequency 0.323 PASSED
CumulativeSums 0.819 PASSED
CumulativeSums 0.265 PASSED
Runs 0.187 PASSED
LongestRun 0.864 PASSED
Rank 0.372 PASSED
DFT 0.341 PASSED
NonOverlappingTemplate 0.016 PASSED
OverlappingTemplate 0.748 PASSED
Universal 0.381 PASSED
ApproximateEntropy 0.509 PASSED
RandomExcursions 0.315 PASSED
RandomExcursionsVariant 0.047 PASSED
Serial 0.318 PASSED
LinearComplexity 0.373 PASSED
TABLE I. Result of Dieharder (left) and NIST (right) test suite on the extracted random numbers. In the case of multiple
tests in a category, the smallest have been reported.
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